

Message Text

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P 030825Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0460

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 10 MBFR VIENNA 0283

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS OCTOBER 1, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0282

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION
WITH EASTERN REPS ON OCTOBER 1, 1974. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH
5 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

6. KHLESTOV OPENED THE SESSION. HE WELCOMED THE PARTICIPANTS
AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO LEAD OFF WITH SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
SINCE THE PRESENT SESSION WAS THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION SINCE
THE SUMMER BREAK, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO BEGIN WITH A
GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE OVERALL STATUS OF THE VIENNA

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NEGOTIATIONS. DURING THE RECESS, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD AN

OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS CAREFULLY THE POSITIONS OF EACH SIDE AND TO INFORM THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ON THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT GOVERNMENTS HAD HAD THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE THE POSITION OF EACH SIDE IN DETAIL, IT WAS ALL THE MORE APPROPRIATE TO EXCHANGE GENERAL VIEWS NOW ON THE OVERALL SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WAS THE PRACTICE OF THE PRESENT GROUP TO HOLD FRANK EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE ENTIRE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WISHED ON THIS OCCASION TO GIVE A FRANK AND PERHAPS EVEN OUT-SPOKEN STATEMENT OF THE EASTERN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ENABLE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN POSITION AND HELP IN THE EFFORT TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

7. KHESTOV SAID THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, IN THE THIRD ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO BRING THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES CLOSER OR TO ENSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT TO BRING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, HE BELIEVED IT WAS DESIRABLE TO COMPARE THE RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS OF BOTH SIDES TO SEE WHERE THE CHIEF DIFFICULTY LAY. THE SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FAVORED CARRYING OUT MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE PRESERVING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER HAND WISHED TO CHANGE THIS RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. THIS WAS THE CENTRAL DIFFICULTY IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS BASIC DIFFICULTY HAD PREVENTED FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR BECAUSE IT HAD RESULTED IN A WESTERN POSITION WHICH WAS DISTORTED AND WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IT WAS THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY PRESENTLY BLOCKING FORWARD PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE IN THIS REGARD THE IMPORTANCE OF CARRYING OUT REDUCTIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT THE EXISTING "BALANCE" (SIC) OF FORCES WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND NOT DISTURBED. DURING PAST INFORMAL SESSIONS,

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EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY PRESENTED NUMEROUS ARGUMENTS TO SHOW WHY THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THERE EXISTED ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS VIEW, WHICH WAS NOT ONLY AN EASTERN ONE. TO THE CONTRARY, THE ARGUMENT THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN PUTTING FORWARD THAT THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE LEFT UNCHANGED IN THE INTEREST OF ALL HAD IN FACT BEEN RECOGNIZED BY VARIOUS

EXPERT AND AUTHORITATIVE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE WEST. RECENT VIEWS FROM THIS QUARTER SERVED
TO PROVE THAT THE EASTERN VIEW WAS WELL-FOUNDED.

9. KHESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH HAD AGAIN
REVIEWED THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE STATUS OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, HAD ONCE MORE CONCLUDED THAT THIS APPROACH OF
MAINTAINING THE OVERALL BALANCE UNCHANGED WAS AN EQUITABLE
APPROACH. HE DID NOT WISH TO CITE IN DETAIL THE PERTINENT
VIEWS OF ALL GROUPS AND INSTITUTES IN THE WEST WHICH HAD
SUPPORTED THIS VIEWPOINT, BUT WOULD GIVE A FEW IMPORTANT
EXAMPLES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE,
SIPRI, HAD IN ITS STUDY OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE EMPHASIZED THAT PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF
FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS PROBABLY ESSENTIAL FOR
A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF ANY NATO-WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATION
ON FORCE REDUCTIONS. DURING THE PAST MONTH OF AUGUST,
A GROUP OF PROMINENT EXPERTS IN THE PUGWASH SESSION
WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BADEN HAD EMPHASIZED THAT A
MILITARY BALANCE ALREADY EXISTS IN EUROPE AND THAT THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD AVOID JEOPARDIZING THAT
BALANCE AND AIM AT PRESERVING IT AT A LOWER LEVEL OF
FORCES AND COSTS.

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10. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THESE VIEWS SERVED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE CENTRAL POINT HE HAD BEEN MAKING WAS NOT ONLY THE VIEW OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. FURTHER FACTORS WHICH JUSTIFIED THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT ON MAINTAINING THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES WAS THAT THIS APPROACH WAS EQUITABLE. IT WAS OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED: MILITARY SPECIALISTS WHO DEALT WITH THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE ALWAYS ASSESSED THE SITUATION THERE BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL MILITARY ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION AND ALL TYPES OF FORCES. THIS TOO WAS PRECISELY THE VIEW OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN VIEW TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED TO BE BASED ON THIS CENTRAL APPROACH, AS WELL AS ON THE AGREEMENTS REACHED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

11. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO RECALL IN THIS CONTEXT THE
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CRITERION WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS AS TO HOW REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD RECOLLECT THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973, HAD SPECIFIED THAT, "SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF EACH PARTY." THEREFORE, IT FOLLOWED QUITE CLEARLY THAT ALL SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS OR SOLUTIONS SHOULD CONFORM AT EACH POINT TO THIS PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

12. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IF PARTICIPANTS ASSESSED THE PROPOSALS OF EACH SIDE IN TERMS OF THIS CRITERION AS THE EAST HAD DONE, THEY WOULD REACH THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: FIRST, AS REGARDS THE PLAN OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE PERIOD OF THREE YEARS PROVIDED FOR IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT ALSO PROVIDED FOR SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS IN EACH OF THE THREE YEARS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS FULLY CONFORMED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT EVERY POINT. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY GROUPINGS. IT COVERED ALL BRANCHES OF THE ARMED

SERVICES, GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY. THEREFORE, IT PROVIDED FOR EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL. THIS ASPECT WAS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE AGREEMENT IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS THAT ONLY NAVIES WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM REDUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT, THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAD DEMONSTRATED THEIR READINESS TO ASSUME CLEAR OBLIGATIONS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PRESUMED THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO DO LIKEWISE. UNDER THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DID NOT PROPOSE GREATER OBLIGATIONS FOR THE WEST THAN THEY WERE READY AND WILLING TO ASSUME TO THEMSELVES.

13. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD JUST CITED A FEW MAIN EXAMPLES TO SHOW HOW THE EASTERN PLAN CONFORMED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE ASSESSED THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, IT BECAME
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CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN PLAN DIVERGED FROM THIS PRINCIPLE. HE WOULD GIVE ONLY A FEW EXAMPLES TO DEMONSTRATE THIS CONCLUSION: THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AGAIN, THE ONLY EXCEPTION AGREED DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WAS THAT NAVAL FORCES WOULD NOT BE REDUCED. DESPITE THIS FACT, THE WESTERN PROGRAM PROVIDED FOR A REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES ONLY, RATHER THAN ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE PROGRAM FURTHER DEPARTED FROM THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO THEHGJOX0").\$ AJXWEIDROPOSALS, THE ARMED FORCES OF ONL TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT EVERY STAGE.

14. KHLESTOV SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO ANALYZE THE ENTIRE WESTERN PROGRAM ON THIS OCCASION. BUT HE DID WISH TO SAY THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE WESTERN "MODIFICATIONS" INTRODUCED DURING THE LAST ROUND. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED THEIR VIEW ABOUT THESE "SO-CALLED AMENDMENTS" OR STEPS TOWARD A MIDDLE GROUND POSITION. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THESE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CHANGE THE ESSENCE OR BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE OVERALL WESTERN PROPOSAL, A FACT WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR EAST TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. (HERE KHLESTOV CORRECTED HIS INTERPRETER, WHO HAD STATED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE AGREED QUESTION WAS "UNACCEPTABLE" RATHER

THAN "DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.")

15. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALL OF THESE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS WERE FULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OVERALL WESTERN APPROACH. THEY DID NOT CHANGE OR MODIFY THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS OR MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. AS FOR THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, IT WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR AS FAR AS THE VIEWS OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE CONCERNED, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

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EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES COULD SEE NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE CASE. WESTERN ARGUMENTS HAD NOT CONVINCED EASTERN REPS OF A REASON WHY THE FRG, BELGIUM, THE UK AND OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. SINCE THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED IN GREAT DETAIL, HE WISHED ONLY TO EMPHASIZE THAT EASTERN REPS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION WHICH HAD EMERGED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS UP TO THIS POINT: THAT ALL FOUR EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, WHILE THE EASTERN REPS FACED A LACK OF WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE US TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

16. KHLESTOV SAID, TO SUM UP, DURING THE SUMMER RECESS, THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD CONSIDERED CAREFULLY THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR AND THEIR PRESENT STATUS. THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS FIRMLY BELIEVED THAT THE

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VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WERE SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT. EASTERN REPS FIRMLY SOUGHT AND DESIRED TO ENSURE PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE SUCCESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE FOR THE SITUATION IN EUROPE THROUGH SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD WELCOME PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. EASTERN GOVERNMENTS WERE AWARE OF THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO BE FRANK, CONSIDERED THAT THE BASIC DIFFICULTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS CAUSED BY THE PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, POSITIONS WHICH WERE IMPEDING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, HE WISHED TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT, DURING THE FORTHCOMING ROUND OF THE TALKS, EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT

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IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO FIND SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD IN FACT CONFORM TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO HAVE THESE REMARKS SOUND LIKE ACCUSATIONS. HE MERELY WISHED TO PRESENT THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE VIENNA TALKS. HE WISHED TO ASSURE HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES THAT THE EAST WAS FULLY DETERMINED TO SEEK FORWARD MOVEMENT AND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS.

17. FRG REP RESPONDED TO KHLESTOV THAT ALLIED REPS HAD TAKEN NOTE OF KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT SUMMARIZING THE EASTERN POSITION. NATO GOVERNMENTS SHARED THE VIEW THAT

THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT AND SHARED THE STATED EASTERN DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS. THIS OBSERVATION BROUGHT HIM TO THE ISSUE WHICH HAD BEEN DEALT WITH AT LENGTH IN THE LAST ROUND AND HE WISHED TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS ON THAT ISSUE IN BEHALF OF HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES. SPEAKING ON THE BASIS OF TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BEGIN THIS CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BY REACHING TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THEY CONSIDERED THAT ENOUGH HAD ALREADY BEEN SAID IN DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC TO MAKE POSSIBLE A PRACTICAL OUTCOME SOON -- AND PRACTICAL MOVES ARE WHAT THEY BELIEVED BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN AT THIS POINT.

18. FRG REP SAID THAT IT REMAINED UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OVERALL PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE, AND WOULD BE TENTATIVE PENDING RESOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST WAS THE MOST MANAGEABLE, THOROUGHLY EXPLORED AND EASIEST QUESTION TO RESOLVE. ITS RESOLUTION WOULD FACILITATE PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER ISSUES PARTICIPANTS WERE CALLED ON TO SOLVE WHICH WERE NOT AT THIS STATE OF PREPARATION AND WHICH WOULD TAKE LONG TO DEAL WITH. AND AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION WOULD PROVIDE A CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION THAT
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PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS POSSIBLE, THUS REFUTING PESSIMISTS AND CRITICS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDINGLY, ALLIED REPS HOPED THAT EAST WAS NOW IN A POSITION TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION SO THAT ANY REMAINING DETAILS COULD BE CLARIFIED.

19. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND. DURING THE PREVIOUS ROUND, PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD AN EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EAST HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE INITIAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ONLY THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, AND THAT REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. ALLIED REPS COULD NOT AND CANNOT AGREE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS, FOR THEIR PART, DID NOT AGREE WITH WESTERN APPROACH

TO THE QUESTION. IT WAS THEREFORE CLEAR THAT, IN ORDER TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOME MIDDLE GROUND HAD TO BE FOUND. SO, IN AN EFFORT TO REACH THE MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION, WEST HAD OFFERED TO MODIFY ITS POSITION IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT RESPECTS SO THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD, IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THEIR FORCES.

20. TO SUMMARIZE THE STEPS WEST HAD TAKEN:

A. WEST HAD SUGGESTED THAT A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFY WHEN THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN.

B. WEST HAD INDICATED THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN BOTH PHASES.

C. WEST WAS READY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A REASONABLE TIME FOR THE DURATION OF PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH A REVIEW CLAUSE.

DWEST WAS READY TO ENTER A MUTUAL COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES.

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E. WEST HAD SAID THAT WESTERN REDUCTIONS IN THAT SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL

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OF REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

F. AS A FINAL STEP TOWARDS REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WEST HAD TOLD EAST THAT WEST WAS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GROUND FORCES OF ALL REMAINING WESTEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG, WOULD BE INCLUDED IN PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS.

21. FRG REP SAID THAT EACH OF THESE STEPS MET A SPECIFIC CONCERN EAST HAD EXPRESSED REGARDING OUR APPROACH. THEY WERE A CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF WEST'S SERIOUSNESS, FLEXIBILITY, AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE EAST'S STATED CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE STEPS PROVIDED THE MIDDLE GROUND ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE
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REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THEY REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE FROM INITIAL WESTERN POSITION IN THAT THEY WOULD INVOLVE ACCEPTANCE BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF CERTAIN QUITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS FROM THE OUTSET. WEST HAD EXPLAINED WHY WEST COULD NOT ADOPT EAST'S POSITION, BUT WEST DID MOVE TO THE POSITION MIDWAY BETWEEN THAT OF THE TWO SIDES. THIS ANSWER IS A WORKABLE ONE, BECAUSE MAJOR NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS OF EACH SIDE WOULD BE MET. ON EASTERN SIDE, EAST HAD AS YET MADE NO CORRESPONDING MOVE TO MEET WEST. WEST HAD ASKED EAST, AT THE CLOSE OF THE LAST ROUND, TO JOIN WEST ON THIS MIDDLE GROUND.

22. FRG REP SAID THAT IN KHLESTOV'S OPENING REMARKS, LATTER HAD SEEMED TO REJECT RATHER SUMMARILY WESTERN MOVES TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WESTERN REPS WERE DISAPPOINTED AT THIS RESPONSE TO THE

WESTERN PROPOSALS. PUT FRANKLY, THE EASTERN RESPONSE WAS UNHELPFUL. IT DID NOT MEET THE NEED TO REACH PRACTICAL DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AND TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. AND IT INDICATED A FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. THE PROPOSAL WEST HAD PUT FORWARD WAS A WORKABLE ONE. IF FOLLOWED, IT WOULD MEET THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES. FOR THIS REASON, WESTERN REPS ASKED THAT EASTERN REPS AND EASTERN AUTHORITIES RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION. WESTERN REPS CONTINUED TO EXPECT THAT, WHEN EAST HAD RECONSIDERED THE MATTER, EAST WOULD MEET WEST ON THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE OPENING POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES REGARDING THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

23. CZECHOSLOVAK REP KLEIN SPEAKING FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT, SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE GROUND REFERRED TO BY FRG REP, DISCUSSION IN THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD CONCENTRATED MAINLY ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD NATURALLY PAID CLOSE ATTENTION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE, INCLUDING THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH HAD EMERGED DURING THE COURSE OF THE
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THIRD ROUND. REGARDING THESE WESTERN AMENDMENTS, EASTERN REPS HAD REGRETFULLY FAILED TO DETECT IN THEM WILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO REALLY MOVE TO THE MIDDLE GROUND. ALL OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ENVISAGED EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENT OF THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE PLAN AND WHAT WESTERN REPS CALLED THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES. IN OTHER WORDS, ALL WESTERN STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET ENVISAGED AN APPROACH WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST BECAUSE IT FAILED TO MEET THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND WAS AIMED AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST.

23. KLEIN CONTINUED THAT NONE OF THE MODIFICATIONS ADVANCED BY WESTERN REPS HAD CHANGED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. IT REMAINED AN UNCHALLENGED FACT THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TO AVOID AN UNEQUIVOCAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. ALL ALLEGED MODIFICATIONS ADVANCED BY ALLIED REPS CONCERNED POSSIBLE ACTION BY THESE PARTICIPANTS ONLY IN PHASE II. MOREOVER, THESE MOVES WERE MADE DEPENDENT ON PRIOR EASTEN AGREEMENT TO A FIRST PHASE CONTAINING ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES AND EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CELING. THIS FIRST PHASE COVERED ONLY GROUND FORCES AND NOT THE WHOLE

RANGE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS WERE ONLY MARGINAL. THEY DID NOT EFFECT THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN PLAN.

24. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ALLIED REPS HAD PROPOSED THAT AN AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON A FIXED TIME BETWEEN THE PHASES. BUT THIS PROPOSAL ITSELF ENVISAGED PRIOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN PLAN OF A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION BASED ON THE UNACCEPTABLE IDEA THAT ONLY THE US AND USSR WOULD MAKE COMMITMENTS IN A FIRST PHASE WHILE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES ONLY TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS. THE ONE-SIDED NATURE OF THESE PROPOSALS WAS SO EVIDENT THAT THE WEST ITSELF HAD FELT COMPELLED TO MAKE MODIFICATIONS IN ITS POSITION MODIFICATIONS WHICH WERE THEN PRESENTED TO THE EAST AS A BIG AND IMPORTANT CONCESSION. EASTERN
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REPS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING ON THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WESTERN REPS HAD ALSO SAID THEY COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

25. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THIS FORMULATION MADE CLEAR

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THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE BEING ASKED FOR NOTHING LESS THAN THEIR AGREEMENT TO PHASE I OF THE WESTERN PLAN WITH ITS ORIGINAL CONTENT INCLUDING THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES. NO COMMITMENT FORMULATED IN SUCH GENERAL TERMS COULD PROVIDE A SPECIFIC ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD REDUCE AND TO WHAT EXTENT, AND AT WHAT TIME THEY WOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES. THE WEST HAD ALSO PROPOSED A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT BETWEEN THE PHASES ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DURATION OF THAT COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED. IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THIS COMMITMENT TOO HAD BEEN MADE DEPENDENT ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING PLAN WITH ALL ATTENDANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EAST. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THIS REGARD HAD SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCES ON ITS SIDE FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

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THE TERM "OVERALL LEVEL" CLEARLY ENVISAGED AN OVERALL BLOC-TO-BLOC AGREEMENT. THE EAST DID NOT WISH SUCH AN AGREEMENT. AN AGREEMENT OF THIS KIND WOULD ENABLE SOME DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE OBLIGATION TO FREEZE. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL RELATED ONLY TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. OTHER FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WERE LEFT ASIDE.

26. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD SIMILAR RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO WESTERN SUGGESTIONS FOR A REVIEW CLAUSE BASED ON A PERIOD OF TIME WHICH WOULD BE SPECIFIED. THIS MODIFICATION TOO REQUIRED PREVIOUS EASTERN AGREEMENT ON A SEPARATE PHASE I AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN PLAN AS A WHOLE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. MOREOVER, TO ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIEW ON THIS BASIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ADMITTING

THE POSSIBILITY THAT, AFTER THE FIRST PHASE, THERE MIGHT BE
NO REDUCTIONS
AT ALL IN THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

27. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, AS FOLLOWED FROM THESE REMARKS,
THE MODIFICATIONS PRESENTED BY ALLIED REPS COULD NOT BE
REGARDED AS PROVIDING AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE INASMUCH AS THEY ENTAILED
EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION INCLUDING
THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES. A GENUINELY
CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF
WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WOULD
ASSURE EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS,
TRULY MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS, OBLIGATIONS WHICH ENTAILED
NO ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE. THE WAY TO SUCH A SOLUTION
WAS THROUGH COMMITMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO JOIN
IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

28. US DEPREP SAID THAT IT WAS A POSITIVE SIGN THAT
CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S REMARKS AT LEAST DEALT WITH THE SPECIFICS
OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF
WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THIS
WAS A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH THAN GENERAL REMARKS ABOUT
THE OVERALL PROGRAMS OF BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, THESE
REMARKS APPEARED TO BE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION.

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CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD REPEATEDLY CRITICIZED WESTERN APPROACH
TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT
IT WAS MERELY AN EXTENSION OF THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH
TO REDUCTIONS. TO THE CONTRARY, HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR
FROM THE REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES THAT
NEITHER SIDE HAD ABANDONED ITS OVERALL REDUCTION PROGRAM
AND THAT BOTH SIDES WISHED TO REMIND THE OTHER OF THIS
FACT DURING THE DISCUSSION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE
REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. MOREOVER, IT HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY
AGREED, IN AGREEING TO GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THIS
QUESTION, THAT ANY SOLUTION REACHED WOULD BE TENTATIVE
AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OVERALL POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.
EASTERN REPS HAD NOT SCRUPLED IN EARLIER DISCUSSION OF
THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE
OUTSET TO INCLUDE IN THEIR PROPOSED FIRST STEP SOLUTION
TO THAT QUESTION DETAILS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM.
HENCE BOTH SIDES WERE ON THE SAME FOOTING IN THIS MATTER.
IN THE SPECIFIC SENSE, CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD CRITICIZED A
NUMBER OF WESTERN PROPOSALS SUCH AS, THE POSSIBILITY OF
FIXING A PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION AN
A REVIEW CLAUSE. BOTH OF THESE MIGHT BE STANDARD FEATURES
OF ANY AGREEMENT, IMPLIED NO NECESSARY AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENT

OF THE PHASES INVOLVED, AND IN FACT HAD BEEN REFLECTED TO SOME DEGREE AT LEAST IN EARLIER EASTERN DISCUSSION OF THEIR OWN REDUCTION STEP. ALL IN ALL, THIS EASTERN CRITICISM DID NOT APPEAR WELL-FOUNDED.

29. FRG REP SAID THAT CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD JUST IMPLIED THAT THE WEST HAD FELT CONSTRAINED TO MODIFY ITS POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE WILLINGNESS OF REMAINING WEST PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN SO OBVIOUSLY UNREASONABLE. THIS WAS NOT A FAIR WAY OF LOOKING AT THE QUESTION. ALLIED REPS HAD FELT CONSTRAINED TO CHANGE THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION BECAUSE OF THEIR SERIOUS DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION, AND THIS DESIRE HAD BEEN THE SOLE REASON FOR THE MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED BY THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. THESE MODIFICATIONS REPRESENTED A SERIOUS EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SPECIFIC CONCERNS EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD JUST
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CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS BY THE STATEMENT THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS A COMMITMENT BY ALL TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, TOGETHER WITH THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS. THUS, THE EASTERN RECOMMENDATION ON HOW TO SOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES WAS TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEPTING THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION LOCK, STOCK AND BARREL FROM THE OUTSET. THIS POSITION DID NOT INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO REACH A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION ON THE PRESENT QUESTION, WHICH WAS THE MOST EASILY RESOLVED PORTION OF THE OVERALL SUBJECT MATTER.

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30. CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD ASSERTED THAT TWO PHASES OF REDUCTION WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. YET IT HAD BEEN CANADIAN REP'S CLEAR UNDERSTANDING FROM DISCUSSION IN THE THIRD ROUND, AND EVEN AT THE END OF THE SECOND ROUND, THAT THE EASTERN REPS ENVISAGED TWO AGREEMENTS OR PHASES OF NEGOTIATION, OR EVEN MORE. CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD REFERRED TO WHAT ALLIED REPS CALED THE "ALL PARTICIPANT'S" PROPOSAL, THAT IS THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING IN A FIRST PHASE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE. CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD DESCRIBED THIS PROPOSAL AS A "SO-CALLED BIG CONCESSION" BY THE WEST, IN A WAY IN WHICH INDICATED THAT CZECHOSLOVAK REP DID NOT REALLY MEAN THIS. THE FACT OF THE MATTER WAS THAT THE CANADIAN REP HAD PUT THIS POINT IN HIS OWN RECENT PLENARY STATEMENT IN ORDER TO EMPHASIZE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS VIEWED THIS
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POTENTIAL COMMITMENT. THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAD THEMSELVES CONSIDERED THIS MATTER TO BE A SERIOUS ONE IN REACHING THEIR DECISION. THEY CONSIDERED IT A SERIOUS AND EVEN MAJOR CONCESSION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF REACHING A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION. IT HAD NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION FOR THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO REACH BECAUSE AS EASTERN REPS KNEW, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT A STATE OF INCREASED CONFIDENCE BE CREATED BY PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AS A POLITICAL NECESSITY BEFORE THEY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES.

31. CANADIAN REP NOTED THAT CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD REFERRED TO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE A REVIEW CLAUSE IN A FIRST

PHASE AGREEMENT. CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD ASSERTED THAT THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED SUCH A PROVISION MEANT THEY ENVISAGED THAT THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY REDUCTIONS FROM OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER ALL. IT WAS SCARCELY NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE REASON WHY WESTERN REPS HAD PUT FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL WAS TO MEET THE FREQUENTLY STATED CONCERN OF THE EASTERN REPS THAT THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC OUTCOME. BUT TO SAY THE LEAST, THIS WESTERN PROPOSAL SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT IN THE SAME FRANK SPIRIT WHICH HAD CHARACTERIZED THESE DISCUSSIONS, HE WOULD LIKE HIMSELF TO ASK THE QUESTION IMPLICIT IN CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S OWN REMARKS: "WHERE WERE THE SOCIALIST COUNTER' CONCESSIONS AND MOVES FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT?"

32. US DEP REP NOTED THAT A NUMBER OF POINTS IN THE WESTERN POSITION JUST CRITICIZED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP, INCLUDING THE IDEA OF TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING IN A NEXT PHASE, AND A POSSIBILITY OF REVIEW, HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN LESS FAR REACHING EASTERN SUGGESTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AND FIRST STEP PROPOSALS. BUT EAST HAD NOW REVERTED TO ORIGINAL POSITION OF NOVEMBER 8. THIS WAS CLEARLY A RETROGRADE MOVEMENT.

33. GDR REP SAID HE WISHED TO STRESS THE SERIOUSNESS AND DETAIL WITH WHICH EASTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD CONSIDERED ALL PROPOSALS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DEGREE OF
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INTEREST WHICH THEY HAD IN FINDING A SOLID BASIS FOR PROGRESS. THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS APPRECIATED THE FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH OF THE TALKS. PARTICIPANTS HAD JUST HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON THE MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD PRESENTED EASTERN CRITICISM OF THESE MODIFICATIONS, CRITICISM WHICH HAD BEEN FORESHADOWED IN THE THIRD ROUND. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR PARTICIPANTS IN CONSIDERING INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE STARTING POINT, THE BASIC AGREED CRITERIA; THEREFORE, IT WAS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIABLE TO COME BACK TO BASIC POINTS FROM TIME TO TIME. THESE STARTING POINTS WERE VERY IMPORTANT. THE DISCUSSION IN THE PRESENT SESSION HAD PROVED ONCE AGAIN THAT TREATMENT OF THIS AGREED QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. EACH DISCUSSION OF EACH INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS WAS CLOSELY INTER-RELATED WITH THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD NOT REJECTED WESTERN MODIFICATIONS MERELY BECAUSE THEY WERE CONNECTED WITH THE WESTERN PLAN AS SUCH, BUT BECAUSE OF THE

CONTENT OF THAT PLAN.

34. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT THE OVERALL WEST PLAN WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THAT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS. WHY SHOULD IT BE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST, AS THE ACTUAL COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON THE AGREED QUESTION APPARENTLY INDICATED, THAT EASTERN REPS SHOULD FORGET THEIR OWN PLAN, WHICH HAD A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP TO THE BASIC AGREED CRITERIA AND WHICH CONTINUED ALSO TO REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION? THE EASTERN APPROACH CONTAINED A CONCRETE PROGRAM FOR REDUCTIONS OF ALL ARMAMENTS IN GROUND, AIR, AND UNITS ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE EASTERN PLAN DID INCLUDE STAGES - NO LESS THAN THREE WHICH WERE "BALANCED" IN THE PROPER MEANING OF THE WORD -- "OUR MEANING." USING THIS APPROACH WOULD MAINTAIN THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THE SOVIET REP HAD JUST EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHY THIS WIDELY ACCEPTED VIEW SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS A BASIC EASTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BE MAINTAINED IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT
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DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THESE OBLIGATIONS HAVE BEEN SET FORTH IN A PRECISE AND CLEAR WAY. EACH PARTICIPANT SHOULD NOW WHAT HE IS TO DO AND WHAT OTHERS ARE TO DO AT THE SAME TIME. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS SHOWN IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT AND IN THE WILLINGNESS OF EASTERN COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE THE OBLIGATIONS FORESEEN AND

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ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY. THE EAST DID NOT EXPECT THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS WHICH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE UNWILLING TO UNDERTAKE THEMSELVES.

35. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS WERE NOT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF PROGRESS EVEN THOUGH THEY SAW DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT MATTER, BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THEIR PROGRAM SHOWED THE WAY. PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES SITUATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. CENTRAL EUROPE HAD THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS, THEREFORE, PROGRESS WAS OF DIRECT IMPORTANCE TO THOSE COUNTRIES LOCATED THERE. SUCH PROGRESS WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALL. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL HAVE CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATIONS AND DID NOT ALLOW ILLUSIONS TO ARISE FROM A PROGRAM OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTED THE EASTERN
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DRAFT. IT DESIRED THAT NO GAPS SHOULD BE LEFT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMAMENT RACE IN CERTAIN BRANCHES. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA WERE EFFECTIVELY COVERED IN THE EASTERN AGREEMENT, WHICH CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RESPONSE OF EACH PARTICIPANT TO REDUCE AND TO DO SO PARALLEL WITH OTHERS; THUS, ASSURING THE NECESSARY MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND GIVING PROOF THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE CONTRIBUTING TO DETENTE THROUGH A SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OF THEIR OWN. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDED INCLUSION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND PARTICULARLY, UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAUNCHING VEHICLES IN BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. THE EASTERN APPROACH CONTAINED THE IDEA THAT ALL THOSE UNITS ON EACH

SIDE WHICH WERE COMPARABLE SHOULD BE USED AS A BASIS FOR REDUCTION OF FORCES.

36. GDR REP SAID HE FELT COMPELLED TO EXPRESS HIS VIEW THAT THE EASTERN PLAN SHOULD BE MUCH MORE IN THE CENTER OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET THAN WAS ACTUALLY THE CASE. THIS WAS SO BECAUSE IT ALREADY REPRESENTED MIDDLE GROUND ON THIS ISSUE AND EXCLUDED MODIFICATIONS WHICH DID NOT APPLY THE CENTRAL AND AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS.

37. FRG REP SAID HE GATHERED FROM THE GDR REP'S STATEMENT WHAT THE ALLIED REPS HAD KNOWN SINCE NOVEMBER 8, THAT THE EASTERN REPS HAD CONSIDERED THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT TO BE A GOOD ONE. WESTERN REPS ALSO CONSIDERED THEIR OUTLINE GOOD. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED AT THE LAST ROUND TO TRY TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT THROUGH A SERIES OF STEPS, THEY HAD PROPOSED A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION. BUT WHERE WERE THE EASTERN EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION? THE GDR REP'S STATEMENTS IMPLIED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE WAS TO ACCEPT THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT. WHAT HAD BECOME OF THE EVEN LIMITED MOVES ON THIS SUBJECT THE EAST HAD MADE IN THE THIRD ROUND. SHOULD WESTERN REPS UNDERSTAND THAT DISCUSSION WAS MOVING BACK TO THE POSITION OF NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR?

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38. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID US DEPREP HAD COMMENTED THAT SOME OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE "NEUTRAL", I.E. WERE WITHOUT CONNECTION TO SPECIFIC REDUCTION PROGRAMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, LATTER HAD MENTIONED A REVIEW CLAUSE AND A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO AGREE WITH THIS ANALYSIS BECAUSE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON THESE TOPICS HAD REFERRED TO A FIRST PHASE AND TO A SECOND PHASE, CLEARLY MEANING THAT THE ALLIES HAD IN MIND THE CONTENT OF THEIR OWN FIRST AND SECOND PHASE PROPOSALS. THE MAIN QUESTION WAS WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN THE WESTERN PLAN. AS EMERGED FROM CANADIAN REP'S REMARKS, THE ALLIES WERE ATTACHING A CONDITION TO THEIR ASSURANCES ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS: EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN THE FIRST PHASE. THE EAST WAS NOT POSING ANY CONDITIONS IN ITS APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION. THE WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF ALL EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET WAS NOT TIED TO ANY CONDITION.

39. US DEPREP AND FRG REP DREW ATTENTION TO FRG REP'S REMARK AT THE OUTSET OF PRESENT SESSIONS THAT TENTATIVE AGREE-

MENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. FRG REP SAID THAT MY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, THE OVERALL REDUCTION APPROACH OF EACH SIDE HAD BEEN TEMPORARILY SET ASIDE FOR SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT. BUT ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, THE EASTERN REPS WERE BASICALLY CRITICIZING THE AT OVERALL POSITION RATHER THAN THE PROPOSALS THE WEST HAD ADVANCED TO SOLVE THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

40. GDR REP COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE ON THE PART OF THE EAST TO AGREE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN THE FIRST PLACE. FRG REP SAID THAT IN ANY EVENT, ANY AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.

41. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE AGREED. THIS WAS THE BASIC EASTERN POINT. THAT WAS WHY EAST HAD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION STARTED BY REMINDING ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY HAD ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES, PARTICULARLY THAT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. EAST AGREED WITH THE IDEA OF
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TREATING INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS ONE BY ONE, BUT THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY MUST ALSO BE APPLIED IN THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS. EAST WAS SAYING THAT THE WESTERN PLAN TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS PRINCIPLE. EASTERN REPS HAD STUDIED THE MODIFICATIONS WESTERN REPS HAD MADE IN THE THIRD ROUND, APPLYING THIS

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CRITERION TO THE MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED. THEY HAD ASCERTAINED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH CONFLICTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE AT PRACTICALLY EVERY POINT. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD NO ARGUMENTS TO SHOW HOW THE EASTERN PLAN CONFLICTED IN ANY WAY WITH THE CRITERION THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL SHOULD BE INCREASED THROUGH THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT DIMINISHED. WESTERN REPS WERE CONCENTRATING ON DETAILS AND CERTAIN SPECIFIC ASPECTS. ONE COULD DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER IN THIS WAY, BUT AT EVERY POINT, PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES.

42. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, ALLIED REPS HAD JUST SAID THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE. WHY NOT? WHY DID WESTERN REPS
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SAY THEY NEEDED MORE CONFIDENCE? ANYONE COULD MAKE THIS POINT ON EITHER SIDE. IT WAS NOT A RATIONAL ARGUMENT. WHY COULD THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT ASSUME CLEAR OBLIGATIONS ALONG WITH THE US? THERE WAS NO REAL EXPLANATION FOR THIS. THIS FACT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR EAST TO TAKE THE WESTERN STAND ON THE AGREED QUESTION AS A BASIS FOR SOLUTION. THE EASTERN ANSWER FROM THE VERY BEGINNING HAD BEEN THAT EVERYONE SHOULD REDUCE. THIS ANSWER WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE NO REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD ACCORD WITH THAT BASIC PRINCIPLE. THE WESTERN APPROACH DID NOT ACCORD WITH IT. HE WOULD LIKE AN ANSWER ON THE PRESENT OCCASION AS TO EXACTLY WHY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE NOT ABLE TO ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING.

43. FRG REP SAID THAT IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, HE HAD DETAILED THE WESTERN MOVES TO THE MIDDLE GROUND. IF SMIRNOVSKY HAD MEANT TO SAY THAT ANY DIVERGENCE WHATEVER FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, THEN PROGRESS TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE AGREED QUESTION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

44. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE MAIN PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY HAD TO BE APPLIED TO EACH STEP OF THE WAY AND TO EACH INDIVIDUAL SOLUTION.

45. FRG REP SAID THAT, TO RETURN TO THE REVIEW CLAUSE, SOME MISUNDERSTANDING WAS EVIDENT IN THE REMARKS OF THE CZECH REP. THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT A REVIEW CLAUSE MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A FIRST PHASE WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ADMISSION THAT WESTERN REPS EXPECTED THAT THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE WITHOUT OUTCOME. TO THE CONTRARY, WESTERN REPS WERE SURE THAT IF THERE WERE A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STEP, THERE WOULD BE A SECOND ONE. THEY HAD TOLD THE EAST THIS. THE EASTERN REP HAD DOUBTED THIS CONCLUSION. WESTERN REPS HAD THEREUPON ADVANCED THE IDEA OF A REVIEW CLAUSE IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCERNS. HE COULD NOT SEE HOW IT WAS LOGICAL TO CLAIM THAT INCLUDING A REVIEW CLAUSE IN AN AGREEMENT WAS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

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46. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE THE WESTERN REVIEW CLAUSE WAS TIED IN WITH THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. THE EAST WAS OF COURSE NOT OPPOSED TO A REVIEW CLAUSE AS SUCH. IT HAD BEEN FOUND GOOD TO INCLUDE SUCH CLAUSES IN MANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, BUT THE PROPOSAL THAT A REVIEW CLAUSE BE INCLUDED IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT HAD TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATION INVOLVED.

47. GDR REP ASKED WHY SHOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH FROM THE BEGINNING FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS WHEN THEY WOULD REDUCE AND HOW MUCH. WHY SHOULD THIS ISSUE BE LEFT TO A SECOND AGREEMENT? EASTERN REPS NEEDED THE CONFIDENCE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THAT ALL COULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE CLARITY, MUTUALITY AND PARALLELED IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS.

48. FRG REP SAID THAT, IN A DOZEN PLENARY STATEMENTS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD GIVEN THE REASONS WHY THE OVERALL EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND

WHY THE ALLIES NEEDED PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

49. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHAT WERE THE REASONS FOR WESTERN REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET. WESTERN REPS HAD MERELY STATED THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT WISH TO PARTICIPATE. THEY HAD NEVER GIVEN A LOGICAL REASON FOR THIS WISH. IF THEY COULD, THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THESE REASONS INTO ACCOUNT.

50. US REP SAID HE AGREED WITH SMIRNOVSKY THAT FROM TIME TO TIME IT WAS USEFUL TO REMIND PARTICIPANTS OF THE AGREED CRITERIA AND OF THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES TOOK THEM SERIOUSLY. HE ASSUMED THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE PURPOSE OF KHLESTOV'S RATHER GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE OVERALL SUBJECT MATTER AND HE ASSUMED THAT GDR REP'S PREPARED REMARKS HAD FOLLOWED THE SAME PRINCIPLE. BOTH OF THESE STATEMENTS HAD ESSENTIALLY BEEN A REITERATION OF THE MERITS THE EAST SAW IN THE PROPOSAL THE EAST ITSELF HAD PUT FORTH LAST NOVEMBER. ALLIED REPS ALSO PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE STATEMENTS THE SOVIET REP AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD JUST MADE AS TO THE
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IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED IN GETTING SOME PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPS FULLY AGREED THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT. BUT AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT LED TO THE QUESTION OF HOW ONE COULD GET PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FRG REP HAD GIVEN A STATEMENT OF ALLIED VIEWS ON HOW ONE MIGHT GET PROGRESS. THESE SUGGESTIONS WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH KHLESTOV'S OWN SUGGESTION IN HIS SUMMARY AT THE END OF THE THIRD ROUND, WHEN HE HAD SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD, IN THE NEXT ROUND, SEEK AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS THEREFORE WELCOMED THE FOCUS OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, WHICH WERE ON THE MODIFICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN, BECAUSE ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THAT IN THIS DIRECTION LAY THE HOPE OF SOME PROGRESS WHICH WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

51. US REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD HOWEVER BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE PESSIMISTIC VIEWS CZECHOSLOVAK REP EXPRESSED ABOUT THE CONTENT OF WESTERN MODIFICATIONS. TO TURN TO THESE CRITICISMS AND TO THE SIMILAR REMARK OF SMIRNOVSKY, THERE WAS NOTHING INCONSISTENT WITH THE

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 468

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN THE PHASING CONCEPT WESTERN REPS HAD PROPOSED, ESPECIALLY AS THAT CONCEPT HAD BEEN MODIFIED BY THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED DURING THE LAST ROUND. ESSENTIALLY, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE MODIFIED WESTERN APPROACH TREATED SIMILARLY-SITUATED PARTICIPANTS ALIKE. IT WAS ALSO A VERY REALISTIC APPROACH BECAUSE IT DEALT IN A REALISTIC WAY WITH THE ACTUAL SITUATION WITH WHICH PARTICIPANTS WERE FACED. FIRST, THERE WERE TWO ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS. AS FRG REP HAD POINTED OUT, THE WESTERN APPROACH TOOK APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN REPS HAD MADE A BONAFIDE EFFORT WITH THEIR CLARIFICATIONS, WHICH WERE SUBSTANTIVE, TO MEET THE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED CONCERNS OF THE EAST. SO HE WOULD URGE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS

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BEAR IN MIND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WHICH THEY HAD BEEN

REMINDING ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. BUT TO GET THE PRACTICAL PROGRESS BOTH SIDES WANTED, BOTH SIDES SHOULD TRY TO PROCEED FROM THE DETAILED WORK DONE IN THE LAST ROUND IN ORDER TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE, WHICH PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED IN THE LAST ROUND TO TRY TO SOLVE.

52. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS CLEARLY THE EXPLICIT STATEMENT BY ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT ALL WISHED TO SEEK A SOLUTION WHICH COULD MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND ALSO THAT ALL CONTINUED AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS PERHAPS NOT MUCH IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES IN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. BUT IT WAS A POSITIVE ASPECT AND SHOULD BE MENTIONED. HE FULLY AGREED WITH THE US REP THAT THE REAL QUESTION WAS HOW ONE SHOULD FIND THESE SOLUTIONS. THEREFORE, ONE SHOULD APPLY ALL EFFORTS FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT AND SOLUTIONS. THE REASON THE EAST HAD GONE OVER ITS OVERALL PLAN ONCE AGAIN WAS THE EASTERN DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS PLAN CONFORMED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL, WITHOUT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR ANYONE. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THEIR PLAN WAS AN EQUITABLE ONE AND THEY HOPED THE WESTERN REPS WOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE ITS CONSIDERATION. BUT IF AS FRG REP HAD SAID, THERE WERE SOME "MINUSES" IN THE EASTERN PLAN, EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SAY THAT WHILE CONTINUING TO DISCUSS THEIR PLAN EASTERN REPS WERE NOW RETURNING TO THE STATUS OF NOVEMBER 8. EASTERN REPS HAD NOT DIVERTED FROM THEIR PLAN OF NOVEMBER 8. THEY STILL BELIEVED IT COULD PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. TO BE FRANK, WESTERN REPS HAD SO FAR FAILED TO SAY IN WHAT RESPECT THE EASTERN PLAN CONFLICTED WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BY GIVING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

53. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS REGARDED THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WESTERN REPS HAD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT WESTERN REPS HAD FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS. HE DID

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NOT KNOW WHAT WAS BEHIND THESE WESTERN REMARKS THAT EASTERN ATTENTION HAD BEEN FOCUSED ON WESTERN PROPOSALS. BUT HE DID KNOW WHAT THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PROPOSALS WAS.

THE EASTERN REPS SAID ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, THE WESTERN REPS SAID THAT ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE, WHILE THE GIVE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ASSUME AN OBLIGATION ABOUT SOMETHING WHICH WAS

NOT AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. NATURALLY, ALLIED REPS TRIED TO DEPICT THEIR POSITION AS MID-WAY BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS AS A MEANS OF COMPENSATING FOR SHORTCOMINGS IN THEIR OWN PLAN. THE WESTERN LINE OF REASONING WAS NOT DIRECTED AT HOW TO ASSURE A MUTUAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, BUT AMOUNTED TO SOMETHING DIFFERENT. THIS WAS NOT THE RIGHT WAY TO TACKLE THE AGREED QUESTION. EASTERN REPS HAD REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED THAT THE MILITARY ALLIANCES ON EACH SIDE HAD AN INTERLOCKING STRUCTURE AND THAT ALSO FROM THE MORAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS, IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE ONLY IF ALL PARTICIPANTS MADE REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

54. KHLESTOV SAID ONE COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE SOMETHING ELSE FOR THIS OBLIGATION OF ALL TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS CLAIMED EAST HAD NOT MOVED FROM THIS ORIGINAL POSITION, BUT IT WAS THE WEST WHICH HAD NOT REALLY MOVED. ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT WESTERN POSITION, AS AT THE BEGINNING, ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET WHILE THE UK AND THE FRG WERE STILL NOT WILLING TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE EAST BELIEVED THAT ALL SHOULD DO SO. THIS VIEW WAS NOT MERELY THE PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF THE EASTERN REPS, BUT A CONCLUSION BASED ON ANALYSIS. SO IF PARTICIPANTS WERE SEEKING A SOLUTION, THIS SOLUTION MUST BE AN EQUAL ONE. NOTWITHSTANDING ALL RESERVATIONS THAT THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WOULD BE A TENTATIVE ONE, THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE READY TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE ISSUE WAS NOT WHERE THE WESTERN POSITION HAD STARTED FROM AND HOW THE WESTERN REPS HAD MODIFIED THAT POSITION. AT THE OUTSET, WESTERN REPS SAID THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO UNDERTAKE ANY OBLIGATIONS. NOW THEY SAID THEY WERE READY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS THE REASON WHY PARTICIPANTS IN THESE SESSIONS HAD TO SPEND SO MUCH TIME DISCUSSING THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS. THE EAST

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

WAS WILLING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT WEST MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING REDUCTIONS, BUT ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST UNDERTAKE EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET.

55. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN CLOSING, HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT DISCUSS VARIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS PHASING. THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES. BUT HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE QUESTION ALLIED REPS HAD RAISED ON PRESENT OCCASION, "WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET," WAS AT THE TOP OF THE EASTERN AGENDA.

56. US REP SAID HE WAS PLEASED EASTERN REPS RECOGNIZED THAT, WHEREAS ORIGINALLY THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THAT ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE, THE REMAINING
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FIVE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW WILLING TO ASSUME COMMITMENTS. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE EAST HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE EXTENT OF THAT COMMITMENT. TO CLARIFY WESTERN POSITION HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT WEST HAD TOLD EAST THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE. HOWEVER, THE COMMITMENT WEST WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN A GENERAL PROMISE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT REDUCTIONS IN THE FUTURE. AL REMAINING WESTERN

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG, WOULD, IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, UNDER TAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN PHASE 2. MOREOVER, A COMMITMENT OF THIS KIND, PLUS OTHER COMMITMENTS WEST HAD SUGGESTED, WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY NARROW THE RANGE OF ISSUES LEFT FOR DECISION IN PHASE 2.

57. US REP SAID WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE ADDITION OF THESE NEW ELEMENTS TO THEIR POSITION SHOULD ADVANCE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS HOPED EASTERN REPS WOULD NOW ADD SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF COMPARABLE IMPORTANCE AND THEREBY ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SEARCH FOR SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS WOULD BE ADVANCED BY GENERAL DISCUSSION OF HOW GOOD THE OVERALL APPROACH OF EACH SIDE WAS.

58. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE FOLLOWING WEEK AT THE SAME TIME, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8 AT 1000 HOURS. A WESTERN REP WILL BE THE HOST. RESOR

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